42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3)--A Private
Action to Vindicate Fourteenth
Amendment Rights: A Paradox
Resolved

STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN*

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) provides citizens with a cause of action
againstprivate conspiracies to violate constitutionalrights. No
state actionprerequisiteexists for such lawsuits. However, a paradox occurs when the citizen seeks to use this remedy to vindicate the fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the
laws because such rights do not exist in the absence of state involvement. This article seeks to resolve this paradox by suggesting that private conspiracies to violate equal protection
rights do exist and that Congresshad the authority to provide citizens with a remedy against such conspiracies.
The "Ku Klux Klan Act," enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 and now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976),1 continues
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. A.B., Stanford
University, 1970; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1973. Member, California Bar.
1. The 1976 edition of the United States Code codifies the section which is the
subject of this article as § 1985(c). The Revised Statutes refer to the relevant section as (3), not (c). This number and letter difference has generated some confusion as to proper designation of the section in recent cases and law review articles
concerning the section. Because the Revised Statutes are primary laws, this article will consistently refer to the statute as § 1985(3). There is, however, no difference between § 1985(c) and § 1985(3). The complete text of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1976) (Rev. Stat. § 1980 (1878)) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted auMarch 1980
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to present analytic challenges to lawyers and judges more than
100 years after its passage. 2 The Act permits an aggrieved citizen
to sue private individuals who have conspired to deprive the citizen of constitutional rights. Because of difficulties in interpretation, the statute had been infrequently used.3 This article seeks
to clarify a central issue that has presented federal courts with
particular difficulty in litigation arising under the statute: how to
analyze whether section 1985(3) may be used against conspirators
who seek to deny a citizen's right to equal protection of the laws
under the fourteenth amendment. 4 A clarification of this issue
should increase the usefulness of the statute.
The issue arose following the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Griffin v. Breckenridge5 that no showing of state action
is required in order to sue under section 1985(3).6 This holding
has created two problems concerning conspiracies to violate fourteenth amendment rights. The first problem is conceptual: Does
the statutory language reach conduct by private individuals to deprive a citizen of equal protection of the laws as protected by the
fourteenth amendment when that right to equal protection under
thorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons
within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or
more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy
in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member
of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or
property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or
cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States,
the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or
more of the conspirators.
2. See Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979). This
article does not directly address the question left undecided by Novotny, whether
a conspiracy to violate a federal statutory right can serve as the underlying basis
of a § 1985(3) claim. However, the analysis of this article may provide a framework
for addressing that issue.
3. Id. at 371. See also Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 656 (1951).
4. Although this article focuses on conspiracies to deny constitutional rights
protected by the fourteenth amendment, the analysis put forth here is also appli.
cable to § 1985(3) conspiracies to deny constitutional rights protected by other
amendments. See, e.g., Murphy v. Mount Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189, 1194
(7th Cir. 1976).
5. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
6. See generally Note, The Scope of Section 1985(3) Since Griffin v. Breckenridge, 45 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 239 (1977); Comment, The Troubled Waters of Section
1985(3) Litigation, 1973 LAw & Soc. ORD. 639, 646-52. For a discussion of Griffin v.
Breckenridge, see Note, ConstitutionalLaw-State Action No Longer a Requisite
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 3 SETON HAiL L. REv. 168 (1971); Note, Constitutional
Law--Section 1985(3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1871-Color of Law Eliminated,
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 199.
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the fourteenth amendment does not exist in the absence of state
involvement? Second, even if such a fourteenth amendment violation is possible and is reached by the statutory language of section 1985(3), a legal issue remains: Does Congress have the
authority to enact legislation such as section 1985(3) to provide a
remedy for such violations? Thus, if a citizen seeks to sue conspirators under section 1985(3) for violating the citizen's fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the laws, a
conceptual and legal paradox is created. The essence of the paradox is that, although the Griffin opinion implies that state action
violating a plaintiff's constitutional right is not necessary to sue
under section 1985(3), the constitutional right allegedly violatedthe right to equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth
amendment--does not exist in the absence of state involvement.
This issue did not arise until Griffin was decided because the
statute had not been interpreted as providing citizens with a rem7
edy against acts by private individuals.
It is the thesis of this article that a private action to vindicate
fourteenth amendment rights that are violated by private conspiracies is constitutional and was precisely the sort of remedy that
Congress intended to create by enacting section 1985(3). The paradox is resolved conceptually because this type of action is
clearly possible, and the paradox is resolved legally because this
type of action is constitutional.
THE CONCEPTUAL PARADOX RESOLVED: A PRIVATE ACTION TO
VINDICATE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS VIOLATED

By PRIVATE CONSPIRACIES
A conceptual paradox is created by the notion of a private action by a citizen to vindicate fourteenth amendment rights which
have been violated by a private conspiracy. One must examine
the statutory language to determine whether this sort of conduct
can be reached by the statute.
The statutory construction of section 1985(3) was not fully considered by the United States Supreme Court until 1951 in Collins
7. There are many examples of why a citizen might seek redress against private conspiracies to deprive the citizen of the equal protection of the laws. The
Ku Klux Klan, after which the act was named, historically has been a private
group that directed its activities against black citizens or citizens involved in civil
rights work. See text accompanying notes 15-18 infra.

v. Hardyman.8 In that opinion the Court decided that the section
protected citizens only from those conspiracies that impaired the
plaintiff's right to equal protection of the laws. The Court reasoned that state action was required because the fourteenth
amendment did not shield against "merely private conduct."9
This holding was interpreted as imposing a state action requirement on suits brought under the section.lO
Justice Burton, joined in dissent by Justices Black and Douglas,
argued in Collins: "Congress certainly has the power to create a
federal cause of action in favor of persons injured by private individuals through the abridgment of federally created constitutional
rights."" The dissenters also pointed out that when Congress intended to limit comparable civil rights statutes to require that a
defendant had acted under color of state law, it did so in "unmistakable terms."'1 2 The dissenters compared the color of law language that appeared explicitly in another section of the same civil
rights act, the section now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983,13 with the
absence of such language in section 1985(3).
Twenty years later, this dissenting view of section 1985(3) was
vindicated in Griffin v. Breckenridge,when the Court decided that
section 1985(3) did provide a remedy for damages caused by private conspiracies that did not operate under color of state law.
The Griffin court set out these elements to guide judges in determining whether a complaint stated a cause of action under section 1985(3):
To come within the legislation a complaint must allege that the defendants did (1) 'conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises
of another' (2) 'for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws.' It must then assert that
8. 341 U.S. 651 (1951). See also Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny,
442 U.S. 366, 371 n.8 (1979), which mentions two earlier cases that stated claims
based on predecessors of the section but that were not fully considered by the
Court. For a discussion of the early history of the statute, see Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,50 MicH. L. REv. 1323, 1355-57 (1952).
9. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 658 (1951) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)) (emphasis added). In Collins, plaintiffs, members of a political club planning to meet and oppose the Marshall plan, claimed that defendants
conspired to deprive them of constitutional rights by interfering with their meeting.
10. 341 U.S. at 663-64 (Burton, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 664.
12. Id.
13. The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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one or more of the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done, 'any act in
furtherance of the object of [the] conspiracy,' whereby another was (4a)
'injured in his person or property' or (4b) 'deprived of having and exercis14
ing any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.'

The Court's description of elements (1), (3), and (4) of the cause
of action are taken directly from the statutory language. The first
element is simply the allegation that a conspiracy existed; the
third requires an allegation of the act in furtherance of that conspiracy; and the fourth is a recitation of those damages or injuries
caused by the conspiracy.
It is the second or "purpose" element of the conspiracy cause of
action that is the source of the paradoxical concept of a private
conspiracy to deprive a citizen of the equal protection of the laws
as protected by the fourteenth amendment. In characterizing the
second element of the cause of action, the Court ignored this passage in the statutory language: "or for the purpose of preventing
or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory
from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws."' 5 The omitted statutory
language suggests a partial resolution of the paradox, at least conceptually, by describing a possible manner in which private individuals may conspire so that a citizen's right to equal protection
would be infringed.
The legislative history of section 1985(3) supports the notion
not only that conspiracies by private individuals to deprive citizens of the fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the
laws were conceptually possible but also that the statute was enacted to protect citizens against precisely such a deprivation. At
the time the statute was passed, the Ku Klux Klan and private individuals had acted to subvert state law enforcement mechanisms
and to insure unequal application of state laws. The response by
Congress to this unlawfulness, officially entitled "Act to Enforce
the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, and for Other Purposes," was necessary because state governments were unwilling or unable to enforce
their own laws equally on behalf of all classes of citizens.16 The
14. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976).
16. See Frank & Munro, The Original Understandingof "Equal Protection of
the Laws," 50 CoLum. L. REV. 131, 163-65 (1950); Frantz, CongressionalPower to Enforce the FourteenthAmendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE LJ. 1353, 1354-56

(1964).

members of Congress believed it was the proper and constitutionally mandated role of the federal government to assure that the
states applied their laws equally.
Congress was faced with the situation in which classes of citizens were systematically deprived of their rights under state law
by private individuals, and the states were not protecting their citizens against these violations. As Representative Coburn emphasized, the governors of eight states had invoked the aid of the
federal government to repress the Klan between 1868 and 1870.17
He stated:
[T]here is a pre-concerted and effective plan by which thousands of men
are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. The arresting power is
fettered, the witnesses are silenced, the courts are impotent, the laws are
annulled, the criminal goes free, the persecuted citizen looks in vain for
redress. This condition of affairs extends to counties and States; it is, in
18
many places, the rule, and not the exception.

To the majority in Congress, the failure or neglect of a state to
enforce its laws on behalf of classes of its citizens amounted to a
denial of equal protection of the laws. As Representative Garfield
commented:
[I]t appears that in some of the southern States there exists a widespread
secret organization whose members are bound together by solemn oaths
to prevent certain classes of citizens of the United States from enjoying
these new rights conferred upon them by the Constitution and laws; that
they are putting into execution their design of preventing such citizens
from enjoying the free right of the ballot box and other privileges and immunities of citizens, and from enjoying the equal protection of the laws.
...
[T] he chief complaint is not that the laws of the State are unequal,
but that even where the laws are just and equal on their face, yet, by a
systematic maladministration of them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce
their provisions, a portion of the people are denied equal protection under
them.1 9

The legislators recognized that the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws was an assurance not only against
the passage of discriminatory laws, but also against the inequitable enforcement of facially neutral statutes. Congress believed
that this unequal application of state law caused by private individuals tampering with the states' enforcement mechanisms justified remedial legislation. Otherwise, the guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment would be ineffectual, as Representative
Wilson maintained:
A refusal to legislate equally for the protection of all would unquestionably be a denial [of equal protection]. This conceded, upon what ground
can it be pretended that a refusal to execute, or a failure to do so, through
inability, equally with reference to all persons, is not also a denial? I
maintain, therefore, that the true meaning of this constitutional provision
17. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 456-57 (1871).
18. Id. at 459.
19. Id. at 153 app.
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is that the State shall afford equal protection to all persons within its jurisdiction.
Failing to do this, whether that failure is the result of inaction or inability on the part of the one or the other of the coordinate branches of the
State government, the remedy lies with Congress ....

Whenever it ap-

pears that any State has failed to discharge this high constitutional obligation to all of its citizens, it is not only within the power, but it is the solemn
20
duty of Congress to enforce the protection which the State withholds.

Having concluded that federal enforcement legislation was justified and necessary, Congress decided that the remedy should
operate directly against the individuals who interfered with the
constitutional rights of citizens. By enforcing the laws directly
against these individuals, the federal government would assist the
states in meeting their constitutional obligations, rather than interfere with the states' attempts to enforce their own laws. Again
the legislative history reflects congressional concern:
Shall we deal with individuals, or with the State as a State? If we can deal

with individuals, that is a less radical course, and works less interference

with local governments. To punish a particular individual is less trouble-

some than to set aside a whole State government, declare martial law, suspend the writ of
habeas corpus, and substitute, generally, national for
21
State authority.

It appears that Congress determined that private action was interfering with enjoyment of fourteenth amendment rights and
that it would be better to provide a remedy against the private action than to disrupt the state governments' own processes. Congress enacted the predecessor of title 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),22 which
prohibited private conspiratorial conduct. Congress recognized
that men who "go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon
the premises of another" are not likely to be acting in official capacities. 23 The Forty-second Congress believed it had both the
constitutional power and the obligation to prevent private conduct
from interfering with the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment.
20. Id. at 482 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 459.
22. Ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
23. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 76 (1951), cited in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 98 (1971).

THE LEGAL PARADOX RESOLVED: SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH
,AMENDMENT ALLOWS CONGRESS TO PROVIDE A REMEDY
FOR CONDUCT BY PRIVATE PARTIES WHICH
DEPRIVES CITIZENS OF FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Even though the Forty-second Congress clearly intended to enact a statute that would reach private conspiracies to deprive citizens of fourteenth amendment rights, the question remains
whether Congress has the constitutional power to reach private
conduct. The fact that the private conduct regulated is a conspiracy rather than individual-action makes no difference for constitu-

tional purposes.
In Griffin v. Breckenridge, the Court articulated a clear position
that section 1985(3) was a remedial statute that was constitutional
on its face and that reached private conspiracies to deprive citizens of civil rights. The Court stated: "That § 1985(3) reaches private conspiracies to deprive others of legal rights can, of itself,
cause no doubts of its constitutionality." 24 Thus according to Griffin, state action is not required in order to bring a suit under section 1985(3). Yet if the constitutional right that is violated is the
right to equal protection of the laws, section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment indicates that those rights are violated only if a state
"shall make or enforce any law [which denies] to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."25 It
would appear that the state must be involved in order to find a
fourteenth amendment violation. The question then becomes:
what is the nature of this state involvement?
The Court in Griffin recognized that a conceptual problem was
created by its ruling that no state action was required under section 1985(3):
A century of Fourteenth Amendment adjudication has... made it understandably difficult to conceive of what might constitute a deprivation of
the equal protection of the laws by private persons. Yet there is nothing
inherent in the phrase that requires the action working the deprivation to
come from the State. Indeed, the failure to mention any such requisite
can be viewed as an important indication of congressional intent to speak
'equal
in § 1985(3) of all deprivations of 'equal protection of the laws' and
26
privileges and immunities under the laws,' whatever their source.
24. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104 (1971).
25. The relevant text of § 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 5 provides: "Te Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."
26. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971) (citation omitted).
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The Court emphasized that the violation of a fourteenth amendment right by private conduct could serve as the basis of a section
1985(3) suit or at least that it was conceptually possible. The
Court declined, however, to consider the constitutionality of such
a section 1985(3) action.
As to the source of congressional authority to reach this private
conduct, the legal aspect of this paradox, the Court indicated that
the constitutionality of the statute would best be decided on a
case-by-case basis: "Consequently, we need not find the language
of § 1985(3) now before us constitutional in all its possible applications in order to uphold its facial constitutionality and its application to the complaint in this case." 27 The Court proceeded to
identify the source of congressional power to reach the private
conspiracy by white defendants to assault black plaintiffs alleged
in the Griffin complaint as the thirteenth amendment and the
constitutional right of interstate travel.2 8 These rights are not premised on a requirement of state action or involvement. 29 Thus, in
Griffin, the Court did not have to consider the constitutional
question of whether Congress had the power to reach private conspiratorial conduct that violated fourteenth amendment rights.
There are three possible analytic positions relating to the resolution of this paradox and to Congress' power under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment 30 to reach private conspiratorial conduct to deny fourteenth amendment rights following Griffin. Essentially, they are that under the Constitution, section 1985(3)
covers no such conduct, all such conduct, or something in between.
The first position, the most narrow interpretation, would be that
Congress cannot constitutionally reach, by means of section
1985(3), private conspiracies to violate fourteenth amendment
rights. Adherents of this position would argue that section
27. Id. at 104. This position by the Court at first glance appears counter intuitive-how can the constitutional basis for enacting a statute change depending on
the set of facts alleged in a particular case? However, the cases have made clear
that § 1985(3) is a remedial statute; it does not create any rights that are not already in existence. It merely provides a vehicle for vindicating those rights that
already exist. Thus it is only a constitutional vehicle to remedy violations of constitutional rights, if Congress could reach the prohibited conduct under the Constitution.
28. See id. at 105-06. Justice Harlan concurred specially to say that he did not
rely on the right to travel to reach the result that the statute was constitutional.
29. Id.
30. For the text of § 5, see note 25 supra.

1985 (3) can be used to reach fourteenth amendment rights only if
there has been state action. This interpretation appears to be precluded by some of the language of the Griffin opinion itself.31
At the opposite extreme, one could argue that section 1985(3)
provides a remedy against all private conduct in which individuals have conspired to violate a citizen's constitutional right to
equal protection. This argument is based upon the theory that
Congress is authorized to create substantive statutory rights in
furtherance of the goals of the fourteenth amendment. 32 Although this is an attractive civil libertarian position, it is of dubi33
ous constitutional merit based on decisions at this time.
Finally, a middle position between these two extremes is possible. Section 1985(3) provides a remedy against private conduct to
violate constitutional rights if an element of state involvement is
present to trigger the fourteenth amendment violation. There
would be no fourteenth amendment violation unless the state
were involved, but this involvement need not necessarily be at a
level that would constitute state action for other fourteenth
amendment litigation purposes, such as a suit filed under section
1983.34

This middle position can be illustrated by example. Suppose,
first, that a group of private individuals conspire to prevent a victim from attending a private school. This conduct would be an example of a private conspiracy that violates no constitutional right.
31. See text accompanying note 26 supra. For law review articles asserting
this position, see Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on
State Action and the FourteenthAmendment, 11 ST. Louis U.LJ. 331 (1967); Fairman, Does the FourteenthAmendment Incorporatethe Bill of Rights? The Original
Understanding,2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial Interpretation,2 STAN. L. REV.
140 (1949).
32. This position is discussed in many books and law review articles, including
H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); R. HARIs, THE
QUEST FOR EQUALITY (1960); J. TEN BROEi,

THE ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951); Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative His-

tory," and the ConstitutionalLimitations on State Authority, 22 U. Cm L. REV. 1
(1954); Frank & Munro, The Original Understandingof "Equal Protection of the
Laws," 50 COLUm. L. REV. 131 (1950); Comment, Theories of Federalismand Civil
Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007, 1043-49 (1966).
33. There have been decisions that reached private conduct that interfered
with constitutional rights. In relation to a state constitution, see Gay Law Students v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
34. For a brief summary of the concept of state action, see Brown, Emerson,
Falk, &Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment. A ConstitutionalBasisfor Equal
Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 905 (1971); Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L REV. 1065, 1069-72 (1969). Major cases in this area
include: Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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Although this conduct is socially undesirable, the fourteenth
35
amendment is not offended by this private behavior.
Suppose that this same group of private individuals conspires
to prevent the victim from attending a public school. The fourteenth amendment protects the individual's right to attend the
school from infringement by the state. The state is also involved
in the creation of the right that is being infringed-the state has
created the school for the purpose of allowing all citizens equal
access to the school. The manipulation of and interference with
the state purpose by private persons, who would conspire to frustrate the citizens' enjoyment of these rights, is precisely the type
of conduct that Congress sought to protect citizens against by enacting section 1985(3). Thus the state must be involved in creating the right that has been infringed for a section 1985(3) violation
to exist, but it is not necessary that the state by its action interfere with the citizen's enjoyment of the right.
Notice that the state's involvement in the latter example is
probably not at a level that would be called "state action" for
other fourteenth amendment litigation purposes. 36 The citizen
could not sue the state for violating the individual's fourteenth
amendment right. This is appropriate because the state has done
no wrong. It has been, in a sense, a victim of the private conspiracy along with the citizen because one of its citizens is not receiving equal treatment under the law. The state is duped by the
existence of the conspiracy.
Congress has broad enforcement power under section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment 37 and is "chiefly responsible" 38 for implementing the rights which the amendment guarantees. Under section 5, Congress is authorized to "exercise its discretion in
determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the
35. In Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971), the court found that Congress constitutionally could remedy under the fourteenth amendment an alleged
private conspiracy by militant black organizations to prevent whites from attending a church, where they would not admit blacks to services. It is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that the court's eagerness to find that Congress had the constitutional power to reach this private conduct was motivated by a political view of the
fact situation. However, several other circuits have held that § 1985(3) suits may
reach private conduct. See Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir.),
vacated, 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1975); Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir.

1971).
36. See note 34 supra.
37. For the text of § 5, see note 25 supra.
38. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966).

guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." 3 9 Great deference is
to be accorded to the congressional determination of what measures are appropriate in order to secure the constitutional objective. 40
Thus, the power of Congress under section 5 to enact legislation
is not limited to the language of the amendment, which when
read literally appears to apply only to states. The enumerated
powers in the Constitution specify the permissible goals or ends
of congressional legislation. Congress may select the method or
means that will most effectively achieve the constitutional objective. The classic formulation of the test by Chief Justice Marshall
appeared in McCulloch v. Maryland: "Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 41 It seems that in exercising the enforcement powers provided under section 5, "Congress is not
limited to remedying inequalities which the courts would determine to be violative of the Constitution. It may prohibit conduct
which would not otherwise be unlawful in order to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." 42
Several cases shed light on this problem of congressional power
to bypass the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment and to reach directly to private conspiracies to deprive a citizen of the equal protection of the laws. These cases suggest that
as long as the state has been involved somehow with the right
that is being denied, Congress may constitutionally act to protect
the citizen from the deprivation of the right by private individuals.
In United States v. Guest,4 3 a criminal case brought under 42
U.S.C. § 241, described as "the closest remaining criminal analogue to § 1985(3),"44 the Court had the opportunity to construe an
allegation of a private conspiracy to deprive blacks of equal utilization of public facilities. 45 Commenting that this allegation was
39. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
40. Id. at 653. Many cases support the notion that congressional determina.
tions are presumptively constitutional. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6,
36 (1969); Adldns v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 544 (1923).
41. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
42. Bond v. Stanton, 555 F.2d 172, 174-75 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S.
916 (1978) (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-53, 656 (1966)). See also
Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword ConstitutionalAdjudication and
the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 H.Av. L. REY. 91, 107 (1966).
43. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
44. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 98 (1971).
45. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 753 (1966). The entire indictment appears in footnote 1 of the opinion.
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"embracing rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment,"4 6 the Court found that Congress
had the power to remedy, in this instance by means of criminal
punishment, the violation of these constitutional rights.
The Court did not accept the argument that the indictment
should be dismissed because it contained no allegation that anyone acted under color of state law. The Court noted that although
rights under the equal protection clause arise only where there
has been involvement of the state or someone acting under color
of its authority, the involvement of the state need not be either
exclusive or direct.47 Although the Court declined to address the
issue of the level of state involvement required to create rights
under the equal protection clause,4 8 it seems clear from the four
opinions filed in Guest that direct state action is not required by
section 5 of 'the fourteenth amendment. Rather, it was sufficient
that there was some state involvement, which would be necessary
in order to create the fourteenth amendment right.49 In Guest the
state had provided the facility to which the victims of the conspiracy were denied equal access.
This state involvement analysis has been followed by several
circuit courts. In the Seventh Circuit case of Dombrowski v. Dowling,50 a white lawyer engaged in the practice of criminal law
brought a section 1985(3) suit against the managers of a building
in which he sought to rent office space, alleging discrimination
based on the race of his clients. The court, in denying the existence of a section 1985(3) claim, found that arbitrary business discrimination against lawyers is not an equal protection violation "if
there is no state involvement whatsoever in the discrimination."5 1
Here, the Seventh Circuit looked for state involvement, rather
than state action, as a necessary basis for a section 1985(3) suit
involving a fourteenth amendment violation.
46. Id. No allegation of state involvement had been made in Griln, so the
Court could not easily have based the constitutionality of § 1985(3) on the fourteenth amendment in that case.
47. 383 U.S. at 755.
48. The concurrence by Justice Clark in Guest lends credence to the argument
that § 5 empowers Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies with or without state action-the second analytic alternative discussed in the text.
49. See Note, Fourteenth Amendment Congressional Power to Legislate
Against Private Discriminations:The Guest Case, 52 CORNELL IL Q. 586 (1967).
50. 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972).
51. Id. at 196. See also Murphy v. Mount Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189,
1194 (7th Cir. 1976).

The affirmance by the Fourth Circuit of the dismissal of plaintiff's section 1985(3) cause of action in Bellamy v. Mason's Stores,
Inc.5 2 was also supported by a "state involvement" analysis of the

requirement for bringing a cause of action under the section. The
court wrote: "Although it is clear that state action is not necessarily an essential ingredient under this statute, nevertheless we
think that some state involvement is necessary in this particular
53
application of the statute in order to maintain a cause of action."
The plaintiff in that case had alleged a deprivation of his first
amendment right to free association, arguing he had been fired
from his employment because he was a member of the Ku Klux
Klan. The court found no involvement of the government in this
deprivation of free association and held that the suit could not be
brought under section 1985(3).
In both Dombrowski and Bellamy, the plaintiffs' section 1985(3)
claims were dismissed because they had made no showing of
state involvement in the deprivation of their constitutional rights.
There are few examples of section 1985(3) cases that allege sufficient state involvement to support the claimed deprivation of the
fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the laws that
do not also have the additional component of state action that
would be sufficient for a section 1983 suit.54
An example of a section 1985(3) suit against defendants for a
private conspiracy to deprive a citizen-plaintiff of the fourteenth
amendment right to the equal protection of the laws, which usually requires state involvement, is illustrated in a modern context
by Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Reichardt.5 5 Reichardt
suggests a new frontier upon which the struggle by citizens to secure their constitutional rights may occur.
Plaintiff Ms. Reichardt alleged a conspiracy by insurance companies under section 1985(3) to discriminate against women in
52. 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).
53. Id. at 506.
54. See, e.g., Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F. 2d 899 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,

423 U.S. 930 (1975), where the plaintiff, who was waiting to see a presidential motorcade and was carrying a sign critical of the president, sued the police who forcibly took the sign from her under both §§ 1985(3) and 1983.
55. 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979). The first district court opinion in the case is
reported sub nom. Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975). On December 14, 1979, after this article had been accepted for publication, the district
court issued an opinion sub nom. Reichardt v. Life Ins. Co. of America, 485 F.
Supp. 56 (NJ). Cal. 1979), granting defendants' motion to dismiss. The court found
that plaintiffs claim about unequal enforcement of the state insurance act, which
had been argued in the briefs opposing the motion to dismiss, was "far from the
plain gravamen of the [original] complaint .. ." 485 F. Supp. at 63. In dismissing
the case, the court noted that plaintiff could pursue her claim in the California
state courts where she had a similar action pending.
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the sale of disability insurance as to the terms, conditions, and
rates of that insurance. She also alleged a section 1983 claim
against the state insurance commissioner which the Ninth Circuit
dismissed, holding that there was insufficient state action to support a section 1983 cause of action.5 6 The Ninth Circuit retained
the section 1985(3) claim.
In analyzing the existence of a section 1985(3) claim against insurance companies, the Ninth Circuit focused on the second
prong of the Griffin v. Breckenridge test which, according to the
Court's analysis, required two elements: (1) the violation of a
protected right and (2) an invidiously discriminatory class-based
57
animus motivating the violation.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that "what might constitute a
deprivation of equal protection by private persons" was not
clearly articulated by the Court in Griffin,58 but found such a deprivation of equal protection in the denial to plaintiff Reichardt of
her entitlement to be free from private acts of discrimination as
guaranteed by the state through the California Civil Rights Act.59
It would appear that this separate state civil rights statute
prohibiting discrimination is not necessary to the analysis in order for a section 1985(3) conspiracy suit to be constitutional because state involvement exists regardless of the civil rights
statute. The State of California had established an insurance
commission for reviewing insurance policy forms. The Ninth Circuit held that the mere approval by the Commissioner of the policy forms did not constitute state action for purposes of the
section 1983 cause of action. But this state involvement, although
56. Life Ins. Co. of America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1979).
57. Id. at 502-03. Critics, opposing the interpretation of § 1985(3) to provide redress for private conspiracies to violate fourteenth amendment rights in cases of
state involvement, argue that such a view will open the floodgates, swamping the
federal courts with enforcing a general federal tort remedy. The requirement that
the conspiracy be motivated by a class animus should insure that the section will
be used only in those situations where federal intervention is warranted to vindicate the constitutional rights of the powerless. See Comment, A Construction of
Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46 U. Cm L REV. 402, 429-32
(1979).
58. 591 F.2d at 503.
59. Id. at 504-05. CAT_ Cirv. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1979) provides: "All persons
within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their
sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and
equal accomodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business
establishments of every kind whatsoever."

not sufficient for section 1983, is sufficient as state involvement for
purposes of a section 1985(3) suit.
In the Reichardt case, the state, by creating the Insurance
Commission and the set of regulatory laws, had the obligation to
see that the Commission operated equally in relation to all its citizens.60 No disability insurance policy could issue until the Commissioner had approved the rates and form of the policy.61
Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that because of defendant's con-

spiracy, the state was being hindered in operating equally in relation to all its citizens. This type of problem, translated into a
modern context, is precisely the sort of conspiratorial conduct for
which Congress sought to provide a federal remedy. The state
again is the dupe of the conspiracy and that federal remedy is
constitutional, as long as the state was involved in creating the
right that has been infringed. The state is allegedly being
manipulated by a private conspiracy, here of insurance companies, which is frustrating the state's ability to ensure that a citizen receives equal protection of the laws. The operation of the
State Insurance Commissioner is impaired. Creation of this fed-

eral remedy to protect this constitutional right from violation is
60. As the district court noted in Reichardtv. Payne:
Section 10291.5 of the California Insurance Code deals with the Commissioner's power to disallow disability policies. The section provides in pertinent part, as follows: "Policies not to be approved: Rules and
Regulations: Withdrawal of approval: Review: Construction of section:
When effective: Presumption: Application of section. (a) The purpose of
this section is to prevent, in respect to disability insurance, fraud, unfair
trade practices, and insurance economically unsound to the insured. (b)
The commissioner shall not approve any disability policy for issuance or
delivery in this state:
(13) If it fails to conform in any respect with any law of this state."
Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 (1975), affid in part and remanded sub
nom. Life Ins. Co. of America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979).
61. Id. The opinion goes on to describe the responsibilities of the State Insurance Commissioner as follows:
Section 10290 provides that no disability policy can issue until the Commissioner has approved the rates and the form of the policy. Section
10291.5(b) (13) provides that the Commissioner shall not approve a disability policy that fails to conform in any respect with any law of the State of
California. Section 10291.5(g) makes it clear that the code section is to he
applied liberally and Section 10401 makes it a misdemeanor for any disability insurer to permit discrimination between insureds of the same class.
This section provides that- "Any incorporatedinsurer admittedfor disability insurance and any agent of such insurer, that makes or permits dis.
criminationbetween insureds of the same class in any manner whatsoever
with relation to such insurance, is guilty of a misdemeanor ....
" Although the Commissioner is prohibited from fixing or regulating rates for
disability policies under Section 10291.5(g), the Commissioner still has the
power and the duty under Sections 10291.5(b) (13) and 10401 of the Insurance Code to disapprove altogether a discriminatory disability policy.
Id. at 1014-15 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added by the court).
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constitutional.

62

CONCLUSION

Although the equal protection clause commands no state to
deny its citizens the equal protection of the laws, private individuals, groups of private individuals, or nongovernmental bodies,
such as corporations, all potentially may hinder a state's effort to
assure rights under the fourteenth amendment to its citizens.
Section 1985(3) provides a remedy to citizens for infringement of
the right to equal protection of the laws in all but the first situation in which one individual attempts to hinder state efforts and
63
in which there is no conspiracy.
Conspiracies by groups of individuals or by corporations may
potentially invade a citizen's constitutional rights in a far more
serious way than direct action by government to infringe those
rights. The treatment of corporations as individuals,64 rather than
as the powerful entities that they are, makes the task of developing a jurisprudence of civil rights that affords human individuals
the protections envisioned by the Constitution an urgent one.
Congress had used its power as early as 1871 to enact a federal
remedy for conspiracies to deny citizens their fundamental rights.
It remains the challenge of the twentieth century to see that this
remedy is utilized.

62. See text accompanying notes 37-51 infra.
63. For a discussion of the issue presented by conspiracies of private individuals within one corporate entity, see Note, IntracorporateConpiracies Under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(c), 92 HARv. L. REV. 470 (1978).
64. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).

